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Simultaneity between Trade and Conflict: Endogenous Instruments of Mass Destruction 
 
Abstract 
The classical liberal belief is trade, which economically benefits countries, creates ties 
binding the interests of countries and reduces conflict.  While the vast majority of the 
empirical literature supports this view, recent research questions these findings by also 
considering the reciprocal relationship between trade and conflict.  If conflict also 
influences trade, then trade is an endogenous right hand side regressor and previous 
estimates which ignore this are inconsistent.  This article determines when one uses 
appropriate instruments for the endogenous regressors that trade reduces conflict and 
conflict reduces trade.  Failure to use such instruments results in inconsistent estimates 
and can lead to the spurious conclusion that trade increases conflict.  The lesson is the use 
of inappropriate instruments can be worse than not using them at all.     
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Introduction 
There is a theoretical difference of opinion between classical liberals, Marxists, and 
realists as to the effect of trade on conflict between countries.  Empirically though there 
has been less debate, with the vast majority of research finding trade reduces conflict.  
Policymakers today also agree, frequently citing trade as a cause of peace.  For example, 
the US trade representative Susan Schwab (2008: 6), in the President’s 2008 Trade Policy 
Agenda, noted growth of intra-regional trade in Central America has strengthened peace 
in the region.  Therefore when new research findings demonstrate the contrary, one may 
be quick to dismiss the findings as a mere anomaly or statistical artifact of little concern.  
Given the difference in effect suggested by theory, one should view empirical challenges 
to the liberal peace as potentially significant.  The validity of which depends on the 
reliability of the estimates and the assumptions made.  For in the end, we are interested in 
understanding the true underlying causes of conflict.   
 Most of the international relations literature that examines the relationship 
between trade and conflict has focused on the empirical effects trade has on conflict.  
More recently, attention has been drawn to the reciprocal relationship.  The belief is 
conflict also influences the volume of bilateral trade.  If true, then there would be a 
simultaneous relationship between trade and conflict.  The implication is previous results, 
which failed to control for the endogeneity of trade, would be inconsistent, causing one to 
wonder about the true effect of trade on conflict.  Towards this end, our contribution in 
this paper is to estimate models of trade and conflict controlling for endogeneity, where 
we focus on the importance of choosing instruments both relevant and exogenous to 
produce consistent results.  The results here show trade has a negative and significant 
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effect on conflict, and conflict has a negative and significant effect on trade when 
appropriate instruments are used.   
Typical Model of Conflict 
The typical empirical model of conflict examines whether pairs of countries engage in 
militarized disputes, as defined by the Correlates of War (COW) project.  In some cases, 
researchers examine directed dyads, which allow one to distinguish which country 
initiates conflict.  For observations of non-directed dyads the model specification is of the 
form:   
 tititi uWTradeConflict ,,, 11110     (1)  
where the vector W1 contains exogenous, observed factors, which influence the 
willingness and ability to use conflict among dyads (i) at time (t).  Factors such as 
whether the dyad shares an alliance, border, or political regime type and others that 
measure the dyad’s military capabilities, their interests, and the distance that separates 
them.1  As noted, recent interest has focused on the effects that trade has on conflict.  The 
classical liberal point of view advanced by Kant is that trade brings dissimilar people 
together and binds their interests due to the mutual benefits generated by trade.  These 
shared interests form interdependence between countries that is said to inhibit conflict.  
Polachek (1980) was the first to formally incorporate these ideas into a model relating 
trade to conflict.  In his expected utility model, Polachek (1980) and subsequent 
coauthors (Polachek, Robst, & Chang, 1999; Robst, Polachek, & Chang, 2007) assume 
that the level of trade directly increases the cost of conflict.   Their empirical tests of the 
model indicate trade increases cooperative events and decreases conflict between 
                                                 
1 Bremer (1992) provides a nice discussion.   
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countries.  Further empirical estimates (Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999; Russett & Oneal, 
2001) of equation 1 using various specifications, time periods, and pairs of countries have 
predominantly found trade reduces conflict.2  
 Two recent studies (Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny, 2004; Kim & Rousseau, 2005) 
though cast doubt as to trade’s pacific effect on conflict by questioning whether trade is 
an exogenous variable on the right hand side of equation 1.  Each set of authors posit that 
conflict also influences trade.  This notion itself is not new.  Supporters of the liberal 
peace assume it is the decrease in trade, caused by conflict, which inhibits trading 
partners from engaging in conflict.  Conflict or political instability more generally, 
creates an uncertain environment for economic agents.  Uncertainty, caused by social or 
political instability reduces investment (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Feng, 2001; Rodrik, 
1991).  The potential for physical and human capital to be displaced or destroyed by 
conflict reduces their productivity and the incentive to invest.  The result is capital flight, 
whereby resources are either moved abroad to a safer environment or into industries in 
the uncertain environment that require low investment and are more speculative (Feng, 
2001).  Countries in conflict are thus less able to specialize in industries where they have 
a comparative advantage and are likely to trade less.  Trade between enemies may also 
generate security concerns, which limits trade during periods of conflict.  Several studies 
(Anderton & Carter, 2001; Athanassiou & Kollias, 2002; Mansfield, 1994; Polins, 1989a 
1989b) have shown that conflict can inhibit trade between countries. 
Equation 2 represents a generic model specification of bilateral trade between a 
pair of countries (i) at time (t), which is dependent on conflict.   
                                                 
2 Barbieri (1996, 2002) and Gasiorowski (1986) provide evidence to the contrary that interdependence 
increases conflict, while Beck, Katz, & Tucker (1998) and Goenner (2004) find no statistical relation 
between the two. 
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tititi
uWConflictTrade
,,, 22210
    (2) 
Vector W2 contains exogenous observed factors, which influence trade, such as those 
found in the gravity model (Bergstrand, 1985; Tinbergen, 1962).  The specification 
typically controls for the mass of the two countries within each dyad and factors, such as 
distance, which create resistance to trade.  Other factors that influence resistance to trade, 
including shared membership in trade blocs, adjacency, and common language, may also 
be included (Frankel, 1997).  Variables describing political factors and institutions, such 
as whether the pair of countries are both democratic (Bliss & Russett, 1998, Morrow, 
Siverson, & Tabares, 1998) or share an alliance (Gowa & Mansfield, 1993) have also 
been included by researchers interested in international relations.   
Endogeneity Remedy 
If there is a simultaneous relationship between trade and conflict, where trade influences 
conflict and conflict influences trade, then there is an endogeneous regressor in equations 
1 and 2.  The concern of Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) 
with estimating the conflict model is u1i, t may be correlated with Tradei,t, in which case 
all the coefficients of the estimated model would generally be inconsistent, implying they 
do not converge to the population estimates as the sample size increases (Wooldridge, 
2002: 84).  The solution to producing consistent estimates is quite simple in theory.  We 
need to select a variable to serve as an instrument in place of the endogenous right hand 
side variable that is both relevant and exogenous.  Relevance implies the instrumental 
variable (IV) is partially correlated with the endogenous regressor after controlling for the 
effects of the other regressors.  For the instrument to be exogenous it must not be 
correlated to the error term.   The instrument for trade needs to explain variation in trade 
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(relevance), but have no direct impact on conflict (exogenous), which rules out using 
variables in W1 as instruments.   
A natural instrument choice would be to use a variable in W2, which is not 
contained in W1.  Finding an appropriate instrument to remedy an endogenous regressor 
though is often a challenge in practice as few variables meet both criteria empirically.  
This may result in researchers using an instrument, which is only weakly correlated with 
the endogenous regressor.  Stock, Wright, & Yogo (2002) point out in these cases the 
sampling distributions of IV statistics are in general non-normal, thus point estimates and 
hypothesis tests are unreliable even with large samples.  Further as the instruments 
become weaker, we are able to explain less variation in the endogenous regressor, which 
increases the asymptotic variance of the IV estimates resulting in lower precision.  Weak 
instruments though are often used because the more highly correlated the instrument is 
with the endogenous regressor the less likely the instrument is uncorrelated with the error 
term (Greene, 1997: 295).  If the instrument used is relevant and not exogenous then it 
can be shown (Stock & Watson, 2003: 372) that IV estimates are inconsistent.  Even if 
the instrument is both relevant and exogenous, IV estimates remain biased and thus 
should be interpreted with caution because in finite samples the estimates may not 
converge to their population value.  This implies IV should not be used if endogeneity 
does not exist.  When endogeneity is present, IV needs to be applied using appropriate 
instruments, otherwise it is possible that using an endogenous instrument results in more 
inconsistent coefficients than those from a model that ignores endogeneity completely.3 
                                                 
3 Wooldridge (2002: 102) shows that the inconsistency of a model with a single endogenous regressor (X) 
estimated using OLS is ( , )1 1
OLS u
x
corr x u

 

  , where for the model estimated using 2SLS with an 
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 For now, we will assume trade and conflict are both endogenous and we have 
identified appropriate instruments Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . ZM) to use for each.  Later we will 
further investigate this empirically.  To produce consistent estimates of the linear trade 
model in equation 2 we use two-stage least squares (2SLS), which is the most efficient IV 
estimator.  In the first-stage we use OLS to regress the endogenous regressor (conflict) on 
the exogenous variables included in the trade model (constant and W2) and our 
instruments (Z).  This linear projection generates the linear combination of Z that is the 
most highly correlated with our endogenous regressor and exists regardless of whether 
the endogenous regressor or instruments are continuous or discrete.4  We save the fitted 
values of conflict from the regression, which are uncorrelated with the error term.  In the 
second-stage we run an OLS regression of trade on a constant and W2 from equation 2 
and the saved fitted values.  The coefficient on the fitted value is our IV estimate of 
conflict’s effect on trade.5   
 
 uWConflictTrade
ZWConflict
tititi
ti
,,,
,
  :OLS Stage -Second
      :OLS Stage-First
22210
1220





 (3) 
Two-stage least squares could also be applied to the conflict model in equation 1 
to obtain consistent estimates.  If conflict is a binary outcome, as typically found in the 
literature, then the coefficients, while consistent, represent an average effect.  Probit and 
                                                                                                                                                 
endogenous instrument (Z):  
( , )
( , )
2
1 1
SLS u
x
corr Z u
corr Z x

 

  .  Given u is unobserved we cannot tell 
which coefficient deviates more from the true value 1 .   
4 Use of a probit or logit model in the first stage should not be used.  See Kelejian (1971) and Angrist & 
Krueger (2001) for further discussion.   
5 The standard errors of this second stage will be incorrect as they are based on the fitted values of conflict 
rather than the actual values.  See Wooldridge (2002:  95) for the correction.  Stata’s ivreg2 command 
automatically corrects the standard errors and is used below to produce the estimates of the linear trade 
model.      
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logit models though are generally used to restrict predicted values to between zero and 
one.  Rivers & Vuong (1988) have developed a two-stage conditional maximum 
likelihood (2SCML) procedure to estimate the probit model with a continuous 
endogenous regressor.  In the first-stage we regress the endogenous regressor (trade) on 
the exogenous variables (constant and W1) and instruments (Z), where we save the OLS 
residuals ( 2v

).  In the second stage we estimate the probit model of conflict on the actual 
value of trade, the exogenous variables (constant and W1), and the residuals ( 2v

) using 
maximum likelihood.   
 
, ,
First - Stage OLS:    
ˆSecond - Stage Probit:  
i,t 
i,t i t i t
Trade W Z
Conflict Trade W v u
   
   
   
    
0 1 1 2
0 1 1 1 2 1
 (4) 
A nice feature of Rivers & Vuong’s (1988) estimation procedure is it allows us to 
easily test whether trade is endogenous in the conflict equation.  We test the null 
hypothesis that trade is exogenous using the t-statistic of the coefficient for theta found 
from including the residual in the second stage.  The test is also nice because its validity 
does not depend on the normality or homoskedasticity of the error term (Wooldridge, 
2002).  A more efficient two-stage estimator has been introduced by Newey (1987).6  
Maximum likelihood is also used to estimate the model and will allow for 
heteroskedasticity.  The advantage of maximum likelihood estimation is it is a full 
information method and will thus be more efficient than Newey’s estimator.  The 
negative is the computations may not converge, in which case one can use Newey’s 
(1987) estimator.   
Testing whether conflict is endogenous in the linear trade model can be done 
                                                 
6 The Stata command ivprobit along with the two step option produces Newey’s (1987) estimates of the 
coefficients and their standard errors.  Maximum likelihood estimation is performed without this option 
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using a regression based version of the Hausman (1978) test.  Similar to Rivers & 
Vuong’s (1998) test, the first-stage involves regressing the endogenous regressor 
(conflict) on the exogenous variables (constant and W2) and instruments (Z).  In the 
second step we regress trade on the exogenous variables, the actual value of conflict, and 
residuals from the first step.  The t-statistic of the residual is used to test the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity.  A heteroskedasticity robust t-statistic can be used if 
heteroskedasticity is a concern. 
If endogeneity is shown to be present, then one needs to find relevant and 
exogenous instruments to use IV.  Fortunately we can test the strength of the instruments 
by examining their partial correlation with the endogenous regressor.  This is done by 
regressing the endogenous regressor, whether continuous or not, on the instruments and 
other exogenous variables in the specification.  The strength of the instruments is 
measured by calculating the F-statistic of whether the coefficients of the instruments are 
jointly zero.  Staiger & Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb is an F-statistic less than 10 is an 
indication of weak instruments.  A heteroskedasticity-robust version of the test was also 
developed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006).   
While one is able to test the relevance of an instrument, there is no direct test for 
its exogeneity.  There is, however, an indirect way to test an instrument’s exogeneity, but 
it requires the model to be overidentified, which means we have more instruments than 
endogenous regressors.  With two instruments and one endogenous regressor, we can 
estimate the linear trade model via 2SLS twice, using each instrument separately.  If the 
estimates are sufficiently dissimilar then we know one or both of the instruments are not 
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exogenous  A heteroskedasticity-robust version of this test is also available. 7   For 
models with a limited dependent variable, Lee (1992) has developed an appropriate test 
of overidentification, which is implemented in Stata using the overid command after 
estimating the model using Newey’s (1987) procedure.   
Empirical Tests of Endogeneity, Relevance, and Exogeneity 
 Keshk, Pollins & Reuveny (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) (hereafter referred to as 
KPR and KR respectively) argue failing to account for the endogeneity of trade results in 
inconsistent estimates of trade’s effect on conflict.  They therefore each specify a 
simultaneous model of trade and conflict similar to equations 1 and 2.  Both sets of 
authors control for endogeneity in their system of equations for trade and conflict by 
using Maddala’s (1983: 244-245) two stage estimation procedure.8  To estimate the 
coefficients of the trade equation, the first stage uses probit to estimate the reduced form 
equation of conflict on the exogenous variables and instruments.  The instruments used 
by the procedure to estimate the trade equation are the exogenous variables included in 
the conflict equation and omitted from the trade equation.  In order to estimate the 
equation, i.e. for it to be identified, there needs to be at least as many instruments as 
endogenous regressors.  This implies the variables in Z1  must statistically influence 
conflict and not trade. The second stage uses the fitted value of conflict in place of the 
actual value in an OLS regression of the trade equation.   
 
,
, ,,
First-Stage Probit:  , where 
Second-Stage OLS:  
i t
i t i ti t
Conflict W Z Z W W
Trade Conflict W u  
   
  

     
   
0 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
0 1 2 2 2  (5) 
 
                                                 
7 See Wooldridge (2002: 123) for a more complete discussion.  Stata command ivreg2 produces the test 
statistic. 
8 Maddala’s estimator is implemented in Stata using the program CDSIMEQ written by Keshk (2003). 
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Estimation of the conflict equation is similar.  In the first stage, OLS is used to find the 
fitted value of trade from the regression of trade on the exogenous variables in the 
conflict equation and the relevant instruments.  The second stage uses probit to estimate 
the conflict specification, with the fitted value replacing the actual value of trade.   
 , ,
First-Stage OLS:   , where 
Second-Stage Probit:  
0 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
0 1 1 1 1
   
  
     
   
i,t 
i,t i t i t
Trade W Z Z W W
Conflict Trade W u
 (6) 
 
The procedure is a full information method as the standard errors of the coefficients are 
adjusted to control for correlation in the errors across equations.   
The variables used by KPR (Tables 1 and 2) and KR (Table 3) in their 
specifications of equations 1 and 2 appear below in Table 1.9  Both models measure 
conflict based on whether there was an incidence of militarized conflict.  The primary 
difference in the two models is the measurement of the potentially endogenous variable 
trade interdependence.  KPR use the value of real bilateral trade in natural logs, whereas 
KR use the natural log of the ratio of bilateral trade to the higher GDP within the dyad.  
The latter captures the economic interdependence of the so called weakest link (Oneal & 
Russett, 1997).  A negative and significant coefficient for this variable is said to support 
the classical liberal hypothesis.  KPR’s specification captures the same effect by 
including separate measures of bilateral trade and the higher GDP within the dyad.10  
KR’s formulation of the trade equation is somewhat problematic, as trade dependence is 
specified to be a function of typical gravity variables. It is likely that the ratio of bilateral 
                                                 
9 KR Table 3 specification uses non-directed dyads and COW militarized disputes similar to KPR.    KR 
also analyzed directed dyads involved in international disputes that escalate to force.  Hegre, Oneal, & 
Russett (2010) believe the latter sample is biased as it excludes dyads that did not use force.  For this reason 
and ease of comparison later on we report results using the specification in Table 3. 
10 Increasing trade, holding GDP constant implies trade dependence increases.  Thus a negative coefficient 
on trade supports the liberal hypothesis that trade reduces conflict.   KPR’s treatment is preferable because 
the impact of conflict on the ratios of bilateral trade to GDP is not clear.  For example, interdependence 
could remain the same if bilateral trade and GDP both decline as a result of conflict.   
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trade to GDP is influenced by factors other than those that influence only the level of 
trade.  Also noteworthy is that KPR control for temporal dynamics in their conflict and 
trade specifications by using lagged values of the endogenous variables.  KR instead 
control for temporal dynamics in their conflict specification using the standard 
framework, which includes the previous years of peace and corresponding cubic spline.  
Other minor differences exist in their selection and measurement of variables.11 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Controlling for endogeneity, both sets of authors find that trade increases conflict, 
with Kim & Rousseau’s result strongly significant (p-value < .001).12  For KPR’s 
specification, increasing conflict significantly reduces bilateral trade (p-value .02), 
whereas with KR’s specification increasing conflict increases trade dependence (p-value 
= .26).  Both sets of coefficients and robust standard errors appear in columns 1 and 2 of 
Tables 1a and 1b.  We replicate the results of KPR, but the results of KR are altered when 
using the correct values of major power status, lower democracy score, peace years, and 
spline variables.  KR’s conclusion that trade increases conflict is no longer significant.  
These mixed findings may cause one to question whether the classical liberal 
understanding of trade and conflict was right.  It may though be the case that these 
results, which control for endogeneity are still inconsistent. 
Keshk, Reuveny, & Pollins (2010) have reexamined their model’s robustness to 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, a review of the data used by KR in their analysis revealed six of the variables in their 
conflict equation did not equal the values from their sources (Oneal, 2003; Oneal, Russett, & Berbaum, 
2003).  The correlation between Oneal, Russett, & Berbaum’s (2003) measure of major dyads and KR is 
.36.  The problem is KR’s dataset misses a number of major dyads, one of many examples being Canada 
and the United States.  Further the previous years of peace and the corresponding cubic spline are each 
negatively correlated with their actual values.  For the entire 1920-1992 period KR report the previous 
years of peace between Canada and the United States to be 0, with the actual value ranging from 0 to 54 
when using Oneal’s (2003) code to generate the value.  The lower democracy score was also incorrectly 
classified for 40,582 observations where one of the country’s values was missing in the dyad.   
12 The p-value for KPR’s specification is .27   
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several modifications, which include the treatment of distance and contiguity, size, and 
fatal versus all MIDs.  Their findings show that the effect of trade on conflict is sensitive 
to minor modifications of the specification and generally upholds their earlier conclusion 
that trade does not reduce conflict.13  Recent research by Hegre, Oneal, & Russett (2010) 
has also questioned the sensitivity of KPR and KR’s results to their specifications.   
Adding the log of distance to KPR’s conflict specification, Hegre, Oneal, & Russett find 
trade significantly reduces conflict, contrary to KPR’s positive and insignificant result.  
The questions of interest is why might these results be sensitive to seemingly minor 
changes in specification and what is the real effect of trade on conflict.       
 Full information methods, such as Maddala’s (1983) two-step estimator, require 
the entire system to be correctly specified in order to produce consistent estimates.  This 
implies the variables excluded from the conflict equation and included in the trade 
equation must influence trade and have no statistical effect on conflict otherwise the 
model is misspecified.  There must also be no omitted variables.  The advantage of using 
a limited information procedure, such as two stage least squares (2SLS) is that it does not 
require the entire system to be correctly specified in order to produce consistent 
estimates.  Therefore as Wooldridge (2002: 222) notes the results are more robust to 
model misspecification.  From a practical standpoint this allows researchers interested in 
conflict to focus on factors that lead to disputes, without the need to estimate elaborate 
trade models.  A single-equation approach also allows us to more easily test the 
appropriateness of our instruments.  The disadvantage is full information methods are 
asymptotically more efficient in cases where the system is correctly specified.   
                                                 
13 Of the 36 specifications they consider, there was a positive and significant relationship between trade and 
conflict for 8, negative and significant relationship for 8, and not significant relationship for 18. 
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In columns 3 and 4 of Tables 1a and 1b we report single equation estimates from 
KPR and KR specifications.  Maximum likelihood estimation was used to estimate both 
conflict models and two stage least squares was used to estimate both trade model 
specifications.  Coefficients and robust standard errors for the single equation estimates 
appear in columns 3 and 4 of Tables 1a and 1b, next to the results from Maddala’s 
estimation procedure.  The results for the most part are quite similar across both sets of 
estimates.  Interestingly, the single equation results of KR’s trade model indicate trade 
significantly increases conflict.  The issue is whether these coefficients are consistent, as 
this depends crucially on the validity of the instruments.   
[Insert Tables 1a and 1b about here] 
 Estimation using instrumental variables techniques should only be used in the 
presence of an endogenous regressor.  We use a heteroskedasticity robust version of the 
Hausman test to determine whether conflict is endogeneous in either of the single model 
specifications of trade.  Clustering on dyad, we find conflict is endogenous in both KPR 
and KR’s trade specifications.  The cluster robust t-statistics are 2.09 and -3.45, which are 
both significant at the 5% level.  The next step is to test whether the instruments for 
conflict are relevant by evaluating the correlation between the instruments and the 
endogenous regressor.  The cluster-robust F-statistic for KPR’s specification (60.4) and 
KR (23.9) are both above 10, which indicate the instruments are indeed relevant.  Both 
trade specifications are overidentified so the endogeneity of the instruments can be tested.  
Hansen’s J statistic  is 708 with 5 degrees of freedom for KPR’s specification.  We 
strongly reject the null that the instruments are exogenous.  Similarly, the statistic of 
KR’s specification is 300 and the null is strongly rejected.  Neither set of instruments are 
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exogenous, thus both sets of trade equation estimates are inconsistent.    
 To test whether trade is endogenous in the conflict equation we use Rivers and 
Vuong’s two-stage procedure outlined above in equation 4.  The results indicate trade is 
indeed endogenous in both equations.  The t-statistic on theta is -4.99 for KPR’s 
specification and -14.18 for KR.   First-stage F-tests are applied to test the instruments’ 
relevance.  In both models the instruments are highly relevant.  KPR’s specification has 
an F-statistic of 130,000, while the F-statistic of KR is 31043.   Lee’s (1992) 
overidentification test is used to test the exogeneity of the instruments.  In both cases we 
find that the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments is strongly rejected.  The 
coefficient estimates of the trade and conflict equations in Tables 1a and 1b are 
inconsistent.  
 Overidentification tests reveal the instruments suggested by KPR and KR’s 
models are not all exogenous.  The test though does not reveal which particular 
instruments are endogenous.  Theory may help us identify suspects and suggest 
alternatives.  For example, both authors’ models include contiguity as an instrument of 
trade.  Contiguity is exogenous in the trade equation only if it has no direct effect on 
trade.  Contiguity and distance though are typically both included by economists to 
estimate the gravity model of trade.14  Distance differs from contiguity as it measures the 
separation between two points, whereas contiguity takes into account borders.  Mexico 
and the United States share a border of approximately 2000 miles, yet the distance 
between them is 916 miles.  Compare this to the United States and Belize, which are not 
                                                 
14Contiguity and distance are both used in the earliest application of the gravity model to trade (Tinbergen, 
1962), in its theoretical development (Bergstrand, 1985), and in the most influential recent empirical 
studies (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003; Baier & Bergstrand, 2007, Rose, 2004, Subramanian & Wei, 
2007).   
 16 
contiguous yet are separated by only 889 miles.  If Belize were the same size as Mexico, 
we would not expect higher trade by the US with Belize than with Mexico.  As Frankel 
(1997: 71) discusses sharing a border is an important part of North American trade as 
parts are trucked across borders, where they are assembled, and are then sent back as 
final goods.  Contiguity is thus likely to have a direct impact on trade and is an 
inappropriate instrument.  Other instruments for conflict are also suspect.  Capability 
ratio, for example, is based in part on the population of the countries within the dyad, 
which is a factor known to directly influence trade.  The higher real GDP used by KPR is 
possibly problematic for the same reason.  The instruments for trade are based on the 
sizes of population and GDP, both of which may impact conflict in a direct fashion 
similar to the capability ratio.  
In the analysis below we identify specifications and instruments for conflict and 
trade, where the instruments are shown to be relevant and exogenous.  We focus our 
attention only on models that control for trade and not trade dependence.  As noted 
earlier, we prefer the former as the gravity model explains bilateral trade and it is 
theoretically unclear what the effect of conflict on trade dependence might be.  Control 
variables for each specification are drawn from those used by KPR and KR.  The conflict 
model’s specification includes allies, major power dyads, contiguity, log of distance, the 
slower growth rate of GDP within the dyad, log of the capability ratio, lower democracy 
score within the dyad, and peace years with the corresponding cubic splines.  Original 
data from Oneal (2003) and Oneal, Russett, & Berbaum (2003) was used for most of the 
variables, except for bilateral trade, GDP growth, and higher GDP within the dyad, where 
we used KPR’s data.   The trade model’s specifications consists of the variables included 
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in the most basic gravity model, along with the potentially endogenous regressor conflict, 
the democracy score of the least democratic country within the dyad, and allies.  The 
basic controls include the log of the product of GDPs, log of the product of populations, 
log of distance, and contiguity.  Data for each was drawn from Oneal, Russett, & 
Berbaum (2003) except for bilateral trade, which was from KPR.   
 As noted, it is often a challenge to find an instrumental variable that is correlated 
with the endogenous regressor and yet has no direct effect on the dependent variable.  To 
add to the level of difficulty, one needs more instruments than endogenous regressors to 
be able to test whether the instruments are actually exogenous.  With a single endogenous 
regressor, we would ideally identify at least two instruments to estimate each 
specification.  A benefit of the single equation approach used here is that we can focus on 
the appropriate specification and estimation of one model without simultaneously 
worrying about the other.   
Many of the variables in the gravity model (size & distance) are also likely to 
influence conflict, thus we appeal to trade theory to determine whether other appropriate 
variables exist.  The Heckscher Ohlin theory of trade developed by Nobel Laureate Bertil 
Ohlin and Eli Heckscher explains that cross-country differences in relative factor 
endowments cause countries to specialize and thus trade.  Therefore the model predicts 
that countries with large differences in relative endowments would trade more ceteris 
paribus.  The theory has been used (Deardorff, 1997) to derive the gravity model 
framework.  We use the asymmetry of the dyad’s land to population ratio to measure the 
difference in relative endowments, which is the absolute value of the difference between 
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the two ratios.15  The other instrument used is a lagged version of the endogenous 
regressor.  Here we use the lagged value of bilateral trade, which is a predetermined 
variable at time t.   As Cameron & Trivedi (2005: 106) discuss use of a lagged value is a 
common strategy in application of IV to panel data.   
Similar to the models of conflict, we use a lagged version of the endogenous 
regressor as an instrument in the models of bilateral trade.  We draw on theory to 
determine an additional variable.  In theory, a measure of the dyad’s relative military 
strength could be a good instrument for conflict in our models of trade, as military 
capabilities are unlikely to directly influence bilateral trade flows.  Conflict models 
typically control for the relative strength within a dyad using the COW capability index 
(Singer, 1987), which is based on a country’s total population, urban population, energy 
consumption, military personnel, military expenditures, and production of iron and steel.  
Total population and urban population though both directly influence trade, with urban 
population influencing a country’s ability to achieve economies of scale in production.  
The capability ratio is thus potentially endogenous.  Of the five other components, the 
factor least correlated with total population is the amount of military expenditures.16  
Therefore we propose relative military expenditures within each dyad as an instrument 
for conflict.  The measure used is the natural log of the ratio of the higher expenditure to 
that of the lower for each dyad.  Overidentification tests will reveal whether both sets of 
instruments are relevant and exogenous.   
                                                 
15 Population data for 1950-1992 are from the Penn World Tables version 6.1.  Land area for each country 
is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset for the period 1961-1992 and is from the 
United Nations for the period 1950-1960.  The latter dataset is reported in 5 year intervals beginning in 
1950.  None of the countries in our sample changed size between 1950 and 1960, so the value for 1950 was 
used throughout this period.    
16 The correlation between total population and military expenditures is .28 for the period 1816-1992. 
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[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
The results appearing in Table 2, show that trade has a negative and significant 
effect on conflict.  Our instruments for trade, the asymmetry of relative factor 
endowments and the lagged value of trade are both relevant and exogenous.  Further, we 
find that conflict has a negative and significant effect on trade, when using the lagged 
value of conflict and ratio of military expenditures as instruments.  These instruments are 
also both relevant and exogenous.  The use of appropriate instruments results in 
consistent estimates that provide additional support to the liberal peace, while controlling 
for the potential endogeneity of trade and conflict.   
We also considered the robustness of our results to a few minor changes in the 
conflict model’s specification.  Modifications also considered by Hegre, Oneal, & Russett 
(2010) and Keshk, Reuveny, & Polins (2010).  The first modification is to determine the 
impact of including both contiguity and distance in the conflict equation.  Keshk, 
Reuveny, & Polins believe both measures should not be used and remove distance from 
their specification.  Dropping distance from the specification, we find trade reduces 
conflict, though the effect is not significant.17  Our instruments though are no longer 
relevant or exogenous.  Omitting distance leads to correlation between the instruments 
and the error term.  If one instead omits contiguity, trade reduces conflict (p-value .054) 
and the instruments are in this case appropriate.  Hegre, Oneal, & Russett (2010) argue 
that major power status is an inadequate measure of size and they instead prefer to add 
both countries GDPs separately.  Adding both countries GDP’s to the original 
specification, trade still significantly reduces conflict and the instruments are appropriate.  
Omitting major power status and using the two GDPs does not alter this result.  Another 
                                                 
17 Results for the following discussion appear in a web-appendix.   
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idea put forward by Hegre, Oneal, & Russett (2010) is shared membership in preferential 
trade agreements (PTA) may serve to explain trade and not influence conflict.  
Theoretically, it would seem that economic ties and military ties might be potentially 
related and thus not an appropriate instrument.  Recent research by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) also suggests countries endogenously select into trade agreements, which may 
possibly be correlated to the level of trade.  Despite this potential, we added PTA 
membership to our list of instruments and re-estimated our model.  Again trade was 
found to significantly reduce conflict and interestingly the instruments were exogenous.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
Existence of an unobserved variable, which influences a dyad’s preferences for trade and 
conflict, or a simultaneous relationship where trade and conflict each influence the other, 
can both lead to model specifications with an endogenous regressor.  In either case, 
estimating a model of trade using OLS or a model of conflict using probit will lead to 
inconsistent estimates where the sign and size of the coefficients may be unreliable.  The 
often used remedy is to use instrumental variables in the place of the endogenous 
regressor.  Estimation requires the model to be identified, which means the instruments 
are both relevant and exogenous.  The model specifications used by KPR and KR used 
instruments which were strong, but not exogenous.  Use of endogenous instruments 
implies the IV coefficients of the models are also inconsistent.  We were able to identify 
relevant and exogenous instruments for both trade and conflict.  Using appropriate 
instruments we found that trade significantly reduces conflict and conflict reduces trade, 
which supports the liberal peace proposition.   
Researchers who are concerned with the effects of a potentially endogenous 
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regressor need to tread carefully.  Correcting for endogeneity incorrectly can be as bad if 
not worse than ignoring it entirely.  As discussed earlier, estimating a conflict model with 
an endogenous regressor using probit produces inconsistent estimates as does estimating 
the model using endogenous instruments.  It is possible that IV estimates with 
endogenous instruments will be even more inconsistent than those that ignore 
endogeneity.  Table 3 compares the estimates of trade’s effect on conflict when we use 
exogenous instruments, ignore endogeneity and use probit, and use endogenous 
instruments (factor asymmetry and product of the dyad’s real GDPs).  The consistent 
estimate is negative and significant as is the probit estimate, whereas the IV estimate with 
endogenous instruments is positive.  The inconsistent IV estimate deviates more from the 
consistent estimate than the inconsistent probit estimate.  Another point to keep in mind 
is that even our consistent estimator is still biased.  Consistency is an asymptotic 
property, thus IV estimates may show bias in finite samples.  This implies in finite 
samples it is possible that our “consistent” estimates differ more from the true value than 
estimates that ignore endogeneity.     
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
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Table 1a:  Specification of Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny's Model  
  SEQ  Single Equation 
  Robust   Robust 
Conflict Equation Coefficient Std. Error   Coefficient Std. Error 
LN Bilateral Trade  0.0063 0.0057  0.0069 0.0057 
Lag of conflict 1.9632** 0.0875  1.9615** 0.0874 
Trend of dependence (H) -45.2697 32.4459  -44.2317 31.8372 
Growth rate (L) -0.0091* 0.0045  -0.0087 0.0045 
LN of democracy score (L) -0.1305** 0.0222  -0.1300** 0.0221 
Allies 0.0116 0.0724  0.0129 0.0724 
LN Capability ratio -0.0002 0.0003  -0.0002 0.0003 
Contiguity 1.2175** 0.0729  1.2116** 0.0735 
LN Real GDP (H) 0.0974** 0.0228  0.0963** 0.0226 
Constant -4.6959** 0.3943  -4.6768** 0.3934 
      
n 143792   143792  
Endogeneity T-Statistic    -4.99 p-value < .001 
Relevance F-Statistic    130000 p-value < .001 
Lee Overidentification Statistic    213 p-value < .001 
            
 SEQ  Single Equation 
  Robust   Robust 
Trade Equation Coefficient Std. Error   Coefficient Std. Error 
Conflict -0.0438* 0.0189  -0.6739** 0.1536 
Lag  of Trade 0.8991** 0.0019  0.8990** 0.0019 
LN Real GDP (A) 0.2296** 0.0064  0.2305** 0.0063 
LN Real GDP (B) 0.2339** 0.0061  0.2338** 0.0061 
LN Population (A) -0.0470** 0.0074  -0.0542** 0.0060 
LN Population (B) -0.0812** 0.0052  -0.0829** 0.0051 
LN of Distance -0.2459** 0.0095  -0.2391** 0.0077 
LN of Democracy score (L) 0.0500** 0.0054  0.0538** 0.0051 
Allies 0.0128 0.0145  0.0093 0.0143 
Constant -4.2531** 0.1152  -4.1040** 0.1035 
      
n 143792   143792  
Endogeneity T-Statistic    2.09 p-value .037 
Relevance F-Statistic    60.37 p-value < .001 
Hansen Overidentification Statistic    708 p-value < .001 
(H) and (L) denote higher or lower value within the dyad is used; LN denotes the natural log is used. 
(A) and (B) denote each country separately within the dyad.   
**p-value < .01;  *p-value < .05    
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Table 1b:  Specification of Kim & Rousseau's Model 
  SEQ  Single Equation 
  Robust   Robust 
Conflict Equation Coefficient Std. Error   Coefficient Std. Error 
Trade Dependence 0.0765** 0.0086  0.0692** 0.0072 
Democracy score (L) -0.0388** 0.0042  -0.0364** 0.0038 
LN of capability ratio -0.0465** 0.0166  -0.0455** 0.0159 
Allies 0.0235 0.0603  0.0233 0.0568 
Contiguity 0.8666** 0.0613  0.8232** 0.0620 
LN of distance -0.0218 0.0295  -0.0213 0.0283 
Major Power 0.3805** 0.0659  0.3639** 0.0648 
Peace Years -0.1629** 0.0137  -0.1532** 0.0122 
Spline 1 -1.1E-03** 1.6E-04  -1.0E-03** 1.5E-04 
Spline 2 5.9E-04** 1.1E-04  5.5E-04** 1.0E-04 
Spline 3 -4.1E-05* 2.0E-05  -3.9E-05* 1.9E-05 
Constant -1.2311** 0.1864  -1.1850** 0.1744 
      
n 261609   261609  
Endogeneity T-Statistic    -14.18 p-value < .001 
Relevance F-Statistic    31043 p-value < .001 
Lee Overidentification Statistic    129.5 p-value < .001 
            
 SEQ  Single Equation 
  Robust   Robust 
Trade Equation Coefficient Std. Error   Coefficient Std. Error 
Conflict 0.0995 0.0875  10.1894** 3.6307 
Democracy score (L) 0.1547** 0.0057  0.1565** 0.0058 
Allies -0.1402 0.1088  -0.1191 0.1124 
LN of distance -2.1021** 0.0615  -2.0913** 0.0607 
LN of Real GDP 1.5930** 0.0260  1.6279** 0.0267 
LN of Population  -0.7090** 0.0351  -0.7314** 0.0343 
Constant -36.2176** 0.7483  -37.5499** 0.7805 
      
n 261609   261609  
Endogeneity T-Statistic    -3.45 p-value = .001 
Relevance F-Statistic    23.91 p-value < .001 
Hansen Overidentification Statistic       300.2 p-value < .001 
(H) and (L) denote higher or lower value within the dyad is used  
LN denotes the natural log is used. 
**p-value < .01;  *p-value < .05 
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Table 2: Conflict and Trade Specifications with Relevant and Exogenous 
Instruments 
 
Conflict Equation 
  
  
Robust 
     Coefficient Std. Error 
   LN Bilateral Trade  -0.0401* 0.0160 
   Democracy score (L) -0.0110* 0.0055 
   Growth rate (L) -0.0121* 0.0054 
   LN of capability ratio -0.1680** 0.0317 
   Allies -0.0360 0.0745 
   Contiguity 0.9832** 0.0756 
   LN of distance -0.2895** 0.0515 
   Major Power 0.3867** 0.0856 
   Peace Years -0.1742** 0.0172 
   Spline 1 -0.0010** 0.0002 
   Spline 2 0.0005** 0.0001 
   Spline 3 -1.0E-05 2.6E-05 
   LN Real GDP (H) 0.2776** 0.0556 
   Constant -4.2669** 0.6124 
   
      n 119508 
    Endogeneity T-Statistic 1.73 p-value = 0.083 
  Relevance F-Statistic 15.92 p-value< .001 
   Lee Overidentification Statistic 0.518 p-value = .47 
           
  
 
Trade Equation 
  
  
Robust 
     Coefficient Std. Error   
  Conflict -5.6322** 1.0522 
   LN of Real GDP 2.3107** 0.0276 
   LN of Population  -0.8473** 0.0327 
   LN of distance -2.0675** 0.0526 
   Contiguity 1.5654** 0.1662 
   Democracy score (L) 0.0927** 0.0056 
   Allies 0.2018 0.1093 
   Constant -41.2391 0.7756 
   
      n 140872 
    Endogeneity T-Statistic 5.35 p-value< .001 
   Relevance F-Statistic 46.62 p-value< .001 
   Hansen Overidentification Statistic < .001 p-value = .99       
(H) and (L) denote higher or lower value within the dyad is used;  
LN denotes the natural log is used. 
**p-value < .01;  *p-value < .05 
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Table 3:  Comparison of Instrumental Variable and Probit Estimates of Trade's effect on Conflict 
  Conflict Equation    
  Robust    
  Coefficient Std. Error     
IV - Strong and Exogenous Instruments -0.0401 0.0160    
      
Probit -0.0109 0.0061    
      
IV - Endogenous Instruments 0.0435 0.0278    
      Relevance F-Statistic 218.6 p-value < .001    
      Lee Overidentification Statistic 3.974 p-value = .046    
      
 
